The project “Support Measures for the Execution of Operational Auxiliary Actions” was carried out by a consortium of railway operators, research institutes and universities under the auspices of the German Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure from 2018 to 2021. The consortium combined practical experience from Deutsche Bahn and regional rail companies with academic expertise in human factors and safety engineering from institutes such as the Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Engineering and the University of Stuttgart. Funding was provided through the BM 2018‑037/B‑BW programme, which aimed to strengthen safety in non‑standard railway operations.
The technical core of the work was a systematic analysis of 5 314 incidents reported by the Federal Office for Railway Accidents. These events were classified into nine event categories that involve deviations from normal signalling procedures, such as “intervention in the protection layer” or “bypass of the protection layer.” From the incident data the team identified performance‑shaping factors (PSFs) that influence human performance, error rates and resulting risks. A taxonomy of PSFs was developed and applied to the incident reports, revealing that the most frequent factors were procedural ambiguities, lack of situational awareness and insufficient training.
To address these findings the project introduced a structured risk‑assessment methodology. The method combined qualitative hazard identification with quantitative risk scoring, allowing the team to evaluate the potential impact of each PSF on safety. The methodology was applied to the incident database, producing a ranked list of risk contributors and a set of candidate countermeasures. The evaluation highlighted that many safety gaps stem from the modular structure of the Fahrdienstvorschrift (the railway service regulation), which forces operators to navigate multiple interlinked rulebook sections and to keep up with frequent operational notices (BM).
Based on the risk analysis the consortium proposed a suite of operator‑oriented measures. These included checklists that guide operators through the necessary steps in each event category, eye‑tracking training modules that improve situational awareness during train‑control tasks, a two‑man rule (Vier‑Augen‑Prinzip) to enforce mutual verification of critical actions, and assisted self‑assessment tools that prompt operators to reflect on their decisions. Each measure was mapped onto the control structure of the railway system, and a prioritisation matrix was used to rank them according to expected risk reduction and implementation effort. The final assessment indicated that the combined implementation of checklists, eye‑tracking training and the two‑man rule could reduce the probability of error‑related incidents by a substantial margin, although exact percentages were not disclosed in the report.
The project concluded with a set of recommendations for both regulatory bodies and railway operators. It urged the integration of the proposed measures into standard operating procedures, the revision of the Fahrdienstvorschrift to reduce procedural fragmentation, and the establishment of continuous training programmes that incorporate eye‑tracking and self‑assessment. The consortium also suggested that future research should focus on the empirical validation of the risk‑reduction estimates through simulation and field trials. Overall, the study provided a comprehensive, data‑driven framework for enhancing operator safety in non‑standard railway operations and demonstrated how collaborative efforts between industry and academia can translate incident data into actionable safety improvements.
